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Abstract
Victorious alliances often ght about the spoils of war. This paper presents
an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and ght in-
ternally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an
asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of ghting. In turn,
anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal ght reduces the alliances ability
to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding
declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does
not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher di¤er-
ences in the alliance playerscontributions to alliance e¤ort lead to more internal
conict and more intense ghting.
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1 Introduction
Members of alliances who jointly defeated an opponent must decide how to divide the
prize of victory. Such distributional conict could be resolved peacefully or may involve
resource-wasteful ghting. This paper studies how players of a successful alliance cope
with the distributional conict inside the alliance. We explore the choice behavior of
members of a victorious alliance when they decide whether to split peacefully or to
enter into a ght, and we trace the determinants of this choice behavior.
The question of whether alliances resolve a distributional conict peacefully or
whether and when they break up ghting over the spoils of victory has attracted con-
siderable interest in economics and political science.1 Perhaps the most illustrative
examples are in the context of alliances between countries and military conict. Polit-
ical history provides many examples of alliance members deciding to turn against each
other as soon as the goal of the alliance was accomplished (Beilenson 1969, OConnor
1969, Bunselmeyer 1975). Consider, for instance, the Hitler-Stalin alliance against
Poland that led to the invasion into Poland and the division of Poland between Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union at the brink of the Second World War. The two alliance
members kept peace between them for quite some time, but later Germany attacked
the Soviet Union.2 Other important examples are coalitions of di¤erent groups that
ally to defeat the incumbent ruler. Once this goal is achieved, they may share the
power in a peaceful democratic regime, or these groups may enter into a struggle for
supreme power. While alliances in military conict boldly illustrate the problem, it is
evident that the problem of sharing a prize that has been won jointly is also relevant
in contexts other than war. Alliances often occur in politics when several parties or
politicians team up in an e¤ort to win an election or come into power by other means
and then have to decide whether to share power peacefully or to enter into a dispute
(or costly bargaining process) over the division of power. The two Roman triumvirates
are legendary historical examples; in both triumvirates, the members of the alliance
turned against each other not long after jointly reaching power. Many more examples
1See Kimball (2006) and Johnson and Leeds (2011) for recent surveys and further empirical analy-
ses. Formal model analysis on alliances include, for instance, Morrow (1991, 1994, 2000) and Niou
and Ordeshook (1994). Mattes and Vonnahme (2010) analyze non-aggression pacts as a special type
of alliance.
2Stalins concerns about the stability of the alliance between Russia and Germany in the months
prior to Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, despite British warnings, are discussed by Reynolds
(2002).
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can be found in other countries and historical episodes.3
Violent conict between former alliance partners may be a frequent outcome, but
it is not an automatism. The break-up of an alliance after victory may be avoidable
and is, to a large extent, a matter of choice. In the examples above, former alliance
members could typically decide whether or not to enter into a ght with their former
ally. Violent conict is what political scientists tried to explain more generally, given
that peaceful sharing is seemingly the more natural and often Pareto superior outcome.
Several reasons for why countries may end up in a violent ght rather than nd a less
wasteful negotiation outcome are clearly outlined in the survey by Jackson and Morelli
(2011).4 A fundamental question concerns the relation between balance of power and
the emergence of conict (Organski 1958, Claude 1962, Blainey 1988, Wagner 1994);
some theories suggest that the distribution of power matters for the allocation outcome,
but does not have a strong impact on the probability of ghting (Wittman 1979).
Alliances are considered to play an important role for the probability of resource-
wasteful ghting.5 Some alliances such as non-aggression pacts seemingly try to avoid
violent conict among the countries signing these pacts.
Empirical work on the interaction between alliances and the resolution of conict
su¤ers from severe endogeneity problems. The existence of an alliance or the signing of
a non-aggression pact between two countries is typically not an exogenous event, but a
consequence of the specic conict, which makes causal inference very di¢ cult.6 Our
experimental analysis can cope with these problems and allows causal inference. We
consider distributional conict among players who jointly achieved a common goal in
an alliance that was formed by the rules of the game and as an exogenous event. By
imposing conict with an outgroup, we analyze a victorious alliances ability to avoid
resource-wasteful internal ght about the rent distribution. In the experiment, if the
alliance wins against a joint adversary, the alliance members earn a prize of victory
but need to determine how to share this prize, and they are given two options: They
can either split the prize according to an exogenous rule or decide to break up and
3Similar problems also emerge where rms may team up and form a research joint venture in a
patent contest, but then have to decide how to position themselves when marketing the product they
have jointly innovated.
4These include incomplete information (see Fearon 1995 for a detailed account), commitment
problems (e.g., Garnkel and Skaperdas 2000, Beviá and Corchón 2010), and equilibrium selection in
frameworks with multiple equilibria (e.g., Slantchev 2003 and Konrad and Leininger 2011).
5Studies such as Levy (1981) highlight the diversity of alliances.
6See Levy (1981) for a careful consideration and Mattes and Vonnahme (2010) for an empirical
assessment of the relationship between alliances and ghting and a discussion of the endogeneity issues.
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ght about the prize value. Using several treatments we can test for the importance
of possible determinants of the choice whether to ght and of the ghting intensity in
case a distributional conict takes place.
The rst key distinction is about whether a member of a victorious alliance is
disadvantaged by the share he receives in case of a peaceful settlement or whether
peaceful sharing results in an equal distribution of the prize. The relation between
potential asymmetries in the distribution of power and the resource allocation can
a¤ect the players willingness to settle peacefully (Wittman 1979). We implement
such asymmetries by allocating unequal peaceful shares to former alliance members
who are of equal strength in an upcoming distributional conict, and we study the
e¤ect of such imbalance on the emergence of conict. The observed behavior is in line
with the theoretical predictions in Konrad and Morath (2012a, 2012b): Disadvantaged
players trigger distributional conict even if this reduces their expected material payo¤
compared to the peaceful outcome. Moreover, alliance members correctly anticipate
a higher likelihood of internal conict and reduce their e¤ort when ghting jointly
against a common enemy.7
Second, we test whether non-binding declarations on peaceful intra-alliance shar-
ing ("non-aggression treaties") can help solving the distributional conict inside an
alliance. The study of the e¤ectiveness of treaties by which conict parties mutu-
ally declare to abstain from military conict has some tradition in political science
but comes to inconclusive results.8 We consider two further treatments in which the
alliance members must make a declaration about whether they intend to split the al-
liances prize of victory peacefully or to ght inside the alliance. This declaration is
made prior to the ght between the alliance and the outgroup, but it is non-binding.
In one of the treatments, the declaration is made secretly to the operators of the
experiment, but is not observed by the co-players. In the other treatment, the dec-
laration becomes public information. In both treatments the players can later freely
choose between the option to split peacefully or to ght. There is no monetary cost
or disadvantage from not sticking to the initial declaration, but players may feel some
7This second result also reconrms results in an earlier paper (Ke et al. 2013) in which victorious
alliances were forced into violent distributional conict. There, the exogenously imposed internal
conict caused a hold-up problem when alliance members chose their contributions to alliance e¤ort. In
the theory of contests, this hold-up problem has been emphasized and studied by Katz and Tokadlidu
(1996), Wärneryd (1998), and Esteban and Sákovics (2003).
8For recent contributions see, for instance, Mattes (2008), Leeds and Savun (2007), Long et al.
(2007), and Mattes and Vonnahme (2010). Mattes and Vonnahme (2010) attribute the potential
e¤ectiveness of non-aggression pacts to the increase of reputational cost of aggression.
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mental or reputational cost. In case the declarations are made public, we nd that
most alliance members intend to make use of the ex ante (non-binding) declarations of
non-aggression by declaring an intention to split peacefully, but this does not help to
reduce the likelihood of internal conict. The treatment with unobserved declarations
reveals information on the playerstrue prize sharing intentions and on factors that
made them deviate from their initial declaration.
Finally, we nd that behavior inside the alliance is important for alliance players
choices of conict and the intensity of such internal conict: A higher asymmetry in
the alliance playerse¤ort contributions when ghting the joint enemy makes it more
likely that former alliance members oppose the peaceful split and leads to more e¤ort
expended in the subsequent internal distributional conict. Given that, in our set-
ting, alliance players face a joint history when deciding about peaceful settlement, this
reveals additional information on determinants of the emergence of conict by show-
ing that the (relative) e¤ort contributions to the conict with the outgroup crucially
inuence behavior in the subsequent stages of the game.
Apart from the literature already mentioned above, this research is related to sev-
eral further strands of the literature. We use simple Tullock (1980) lottery contests
as a generic description of conict.9 This type of strategic interaction has attracted
considerable attention among theorists and has been used by experimental economists
and psychologists.10 A small subset of this literature also considers experiments on
group contests or collective action problems with contest elements (e.g., Bornstein et
al. 2002, Parco et al. 2005, Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2006, Amegashie et al.
2007, Abbink et al. 2010, Kugler et al. 2010, Sheremeta 2010, Ahn et al. 2011, Cason
et al. 2012, and Ke et al. 2013).11 These contributions do not consider an endogenous
choice about internal ghting and the interplay of this decision with the performance
of the alliance in a conict with an outside player or outside group.12 Morgan et al.
9See Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatization and Konrad (2009) for a survey on several microfoun-
dations.
10This research program conrmed that players generally expend more e¤ort in the lottery contest
than what would be expected from maximization of monetary payo¤s; see Millner and Pratt (1989,
1991), Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998), Anderson and Sta¤ord (2003), Sheremeta
(2010, 2011), Price and Sheremeta (2011). Explanations for this overdissipation range from non-
monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta 2010, 2011; Chen et al. 2011), spite or inequality aversion
(Abbink et al. 2012, Balafoutas et al. 2012) and mistakes (Schmidt et al. 2011, Lim et al. 2012) to
judgemental biases (Amaldoss and Rapoport 2009, Shremeta and Zhang 2010) and free-endowment
(in-house money) e¤ects (Price and Sheremeta 2012).
11For a comprehensive recent review of contest experiments, please see Dechenaux et al. (2012).
12An emerging strand of literature studies the di¤erence between individual and group decision-
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(2012) were among the rst to consider experiments on conict with endogenous partic-
ipation. In their framework more than two players could enter and ght, and whether
entry caused an expected monetary payo¤ higher than the default payment depends
on the number of entrants. Abbink and Brandts (2009) consider the emergence of
conict between groups where the resource distribution in case of peace is proposed by
one of the groups, but they do not consider distributional conicts within successful
groups and the endogenous break-up of groups. Lacomba et al. (2008) also focus on
endogenous resource allocations and allow the defeated player to destroy (part of) the
resources to be transferred to the winner, which serves as a means to avoid costly con-
ict. The experimental work that is most closely related to our work is by McBride
and Skaperdas (2009). They also consider endogenous decisions of two players whether
to ght with each other, but analyze a dynamic, possibly innitely repeated conict
which takes place between two players only. Fighting today that ends with the defeat
of one of the two players is a way to eliminate any potential for future conict, and con-
ict today therefore becomes more likely when the future becomes more important.13
Our main new ndings are on endogenous break-up of coalitions where alliance players
choose endogenously whether to ght among themselves or share peacefully, and on the
role of asymmetries in peaceful division rules and of non-aggression agreements in this
context. Apart from the evident role of alliances in conict, our setup o¤ers additional
insight on specic factors that inuence a players decision to trigger resource-wasteful
conict.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the formal
framework and the experimental design, and in Section 3, we formulate the hypotheses
that can be tested with this experiment. Section 4 outlines the major results. Section
5 concludes.
making in both non-competitive and competitive settings (e.g., Bornstein 2003, Charness et al. 2007,
Chen and Li 2009, Sutter 2009). Our experiment considers alliance membersindividual (rather than
collective) decisions in the pursuit of a joint cause. This feature applies to a wide array of contests.
13This e¤ect is based on Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000), and there is a larger literature related
to the considerations of bargaining in the shadow of possible future conict. The threat-point in
bargaining problems is a often resource-wasteful ght between the negotiating players. For a survey
on this issue see Fearon (1995); further important contributions to this question are Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996) and Anbarci et al. (2002).
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2 Theoretical framework and experiments
2.1 Theoretical framework
Base treatment. The basic experimental design implements a framework that builds
on the alliance paradox analyzed by Esteban and Sákovics (2003). Two alliance players
(called A and B) are in a contest with a stand-alone player (called C) for a monetary
prize of value v = 450. The game consists of three stages.
In stage 1, the alliance of A and B ghts against C in a contest that follows the
rules of a standard Tullock (1980) lottery contest. All players choose independently
and simultaneously an amount of e¤ort xi  0, i 2 fA;B;Cg. A players cost of e¤ort
is normalized to be equal to the e¤ort itself, and it cannot be recovered, regardless
of whether or not a player wins the contest. The vector (xA; xB; xC) of chosen e¤orts
is publicly observed, and a random device determines whether the alliance AB or the
stand-alone player C wins the prize. The probability for AB to win this lottery contest
is equal to
pAB =
xA + xB
xA + xB + xC
(1)
if at least one of the e¤ort components is strictly positive, and equal to 1=2 if all three
players expend zero e¤ort. The probability that C wins is equal to pC = 1  pAB. If C
wins, C obtains the full prize and the game ends, with monetary payo¤s C = v  xC ,
A =  xA, and B =  xB.
If the alliance of players A and B wins against C, the players enter into stage 2,
where A and B are asked to independently and simultaneously choose between an equal
split of the prize (A and B each obtain v=2) and a contest for the entire prize value. If
both players choose the equal split ("split"), then the game ends. The payo¤s in this
case are A = v=2   xA, B = v=2   xB, and C =  xC . If both players A and B
choose the contest ("ght"), then the game enters into stage 3 for sure. If one player
chooses "ght" and the other player chooses "split", then, with probability 1  ", the
game enters into stage 3, and with probability " the prize is split peacefully and equally
between A and B.14
14Although our experiment aims at explaining distributional conict in situations where one player
alone can trigger this conict, we leave a small probability " (in the experiment, " = 0:1) that the
peaceful split is implemented in case of diverging votes. This is done in order to incentivize individual
choices and to eliminate the (trivial) equilibrium in case of " = 0 in which both players choose "ght",
simply because they expect the other player to choose "ght" and expect to have no inuence on the
outcome.
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In stage 3 (if reached), the alliance playersdecisions in stage 2 are made common
knowledge, and the two players A and B enter into a Tullock lottery contest. Each of
them must independently choose an e¤ort yi  0, i 2 fA;Bg; cost of e¤ort is again
equal to the e¤ort itself and must be paid independently of the contest outcome. The
prize of v = 450 is allocated to A and B, respectively, with probabilities
qA =
yA
yA + yB
and qB =
yB
yA + yB
(2)
if at least one of these e¤orts is strictly positive, and with probabilities equal to 1=2 if
both expend zero e¤ort (i.e., if yA = yB = 0). Hence, if, for instance, player A wins in
stage 3, the monetary payo¤s are A = v   xA   yA, B =  xB   yB, and C =  xC .
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game follows by backward induction.
Stage 3 of the game is equivalent to a simple two-player lottery contest with prize value
v; as it is well known, equilibrium e¤ort is
yA = y

B = v=4 = 112:5. (3)
Since player i 2 fA;Bg wins the full prize with probability 1=2, his material payo¤ in
this subgame is v=2 yi = v=4 (minus the cost of stage 1 e¤ort xi). In comparison, if A
and B split equally, each player obtains a payo¤ of v=2 (again minus the cost of stage
1 e¤ort). Thus, in stage 2, both players A and B will choose the peaceful arrangement:
there will never be a violent breakup of the alliance if alliance players maximize their
monetary payo¤.
In stage 1, the value of winning the contest between the alliance AB and the stand-
alone player C is equal to v = 450 for player C, and it is equal to v=2 = 225 for each
player A or B, given subgame-perfect play that involves a choice of the peaceful split.
Hence, player i 2 fA;Bg chooses xi to maximize i = pAB(v=2)   xi, and C chooses
xC to maximize C = (1  pAB)v  xC . This results in equilibrium e¤ort contributions
of
(xA + xB)
 =
v
9
= 50 and xC =
2v
9
= 100. (4)
Here, a few points are worth mentioning. First, in equilibrium only the sum the
alliance playerse¤ort is uniquely determined.15 Second, the alliance players jointly
15Since the probability pAB only depends on the sum of xA and xB , player i 2 fA;Bgs marginal
payo¤ from increasing xi depends on xA+xB but is independent of the individual e¤orts xA and xB .
See Nitzan (1991) for a more detailed equilibrium analysis.
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Figure 1: Sequence of actions in the BASE treatment.
expend much less e¤ort that the stand-alone player does, which is caused by the lower
share of the prize that each alliance player can win. Third, if, for some reason, internal
conict will be chosen with positive probability, this further reduces an alliance players
expected valuation of winning the ght against the stand-alone player; consequently,
in this case, alliance e¤ort xA + xB should be even lower.16
This three-stage game constitutes the "BASE" treatment in our experiments. Fig-
ure 1 summarizes the sequence of actions in the BASE treatment (for the exact exper-
imental procedures see below). Three further treatments each vary the base treatment
along exactly one dimension.
Unequal peaceful sharing. The rst treatment variation addresses the e¤ect of an
imbalance between the peaceful resource allocation and the distribution of power. This
imbalance is generated by asymmetries in the shares of the prize that members of a
16The asymmetric structure of a conict between an alliance and a single player has the important
advantage that there is only a one-sided incentive problem: alliance players do not have to form
beliefs about the likelihood of internal conict in the outgroup and the induced hold-up problem,
which considerably simplies the strategic interaction and the identication of treatment e¤ects.
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victorious alliance would obtain in case of peace. We exogenously impose that one of
the players (A or B) would receive a share of 70% of the prize and the other would
receive only 30% of the prize. The fact that the peaceful split involves unequal shares
is made common knowledge at the beginning of the game, but which of the players (A
or B) would get the larger share is randomly decided only at the beginning of stage
2 (in case the alliance won against player C). Each of the players A and B has the
same chance of being the player with the larger share. In this way, the alliance players
face symmetric incentives in stage 1, and a players expected prize value in case of the
peaceful split is exactly the same as in the BASE treatment.17 Once the game reaches
stage 2, players learn who receives the small and the large share in the prize in case of
a peaceful split; then, players A and B simultaneously choose between the two options
"split" and "ght", and the game continues as in the BASE treatment above.
A player A or Bs expected payo¤ in the subgame with internal distributional
conict in stage 3 is still equal to v=4 (minus stage 1 e¤ort cost) in this treatment.
Hence, a player who cares about monetary rewards only strictly prefers the peaceful
settlement if and only if his peaceful share of the prize is larger than 25%. Therefore,
for players who maximize their monetary payo¤, the equilibrium prediction for the
choice in stage 2 also remains unchanged: If the alliance defeats the outgroup player,
both A and B should choose the peaceful split, independently of whether it is revealed
that they get the large or the small share. Moreover, e¤ort choices in stage 1 should be
exactly as in the BASE treatment (alliance players still maximize an expected payo¤
of pAB(v=2) xi. If, however, (some) players are motivated by aspects other than pure
monetary rewards, an asymmetric split of the prize may a¤ect the playerschoices and
the likelihood of conict, as we will discuss further below. The marker TR2 in Figure
1 illustrates this rst modication, which results in the second treatment called the
"UNEQUAL" treatment.
Ex ante declarations. Forming alliances often involves ex ante agreements about
how to divide the spoils of victory. Formal unilateral or mutual declarations of non-
aggression are non-binding in an international context and should therefore have no
signicant causal impact on decisions about war and peace.18 This view is contested
17This aspect is important in order to be able to interpret possible behavioral reactions with respect
to stage 1 e¤ort, and ex ante uncertainty about the exact shares in case of a peaceful arrangement is
often not implausible to assume.
18The "realist" school in political science considers the causal relationship between institutions and
peace as weak or non-existent; for an outline see Mearsheimer (1994-1995).
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by other theories in political science.
Do non-aggression declarations a¤ect playerschoices on how to divide the prize
and help alliances to dissolve peacefully? Two further treatments can shed light on
this question. There, we add a "stage 0" to the BASE treatment. In this stage prior to
stage 1, i.e., prior to the choices of e¤orts xA, xB, and xC , each of the alliance players
A and B must make a declaration about whether he intends to ght or to choose the
peaceful and equal split of the prize in case their alliance wins against the outgroup
player C. This declaration is non-binding (i.e., it can be reversed without direct cost
later if the actual decision comes up); moreover, it is restricted to a simple indication of
the option that the player intends to choose ("split" or "ght"). Should the game reach
the decision stage (stage 2), players A and B can make their actual choice between
peaceful sharing or ghting fully independently from their previous declarations. Apart
from these declarations in stage 0, all other aspects of the game remain exactly as in
the BASE treatment (in particular, the equal shares in case of a peaceful split).
In the rst of these two treatments, called "PRIVATE", a players ex ante decla-
ration is not displayed to the public and hence not observed by other players. It may,
however, convey information about the playerstrue intentions of how to divide the
prize, at a point before the conict with the stand-alone player has taken place. In
the second treatment with declarations, called "PUBLIC", the alliance playersex ante
declarations become public information before the players enter into stage 1, and this
public nature of the declaration is known to all players. As in both treatments PRI-
VATE and PUBLIC the declarations are fully non-binding, standard economic theory
predicts that they do not a¤ect the subsequent equilibrium play; hence, e¤ort choices
and choices of prize sharing should be exactly as in the BASE treatment. In the
PUBLIC treatment, however, the declarations may cause behavioral reactions of the
co-players: They may a¤ect the e¤ort contributions in stage 1 as well as choices of how
to divide the prize, as we will discuss after presenting the details of the experimental
procedures. Comparing the declarations in the PUBLIC treatment to the PRIVATE
treatment and comparing actual choices of "ght" to initial declarations allows us to
analyze when, and because of which factors, alliance members deviate from their initial
prize sharing intentions. In Figure 1, an appropriate adjustment would be to add this
declaration stage (stage 0) for players A and B right prior to their actual choices of
stage 1 e¤orts (indicated by the marker TR3/4).
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2.2 Experimental procedures
Before we turn to the main hypotheses, we briey describe the institutional framework
of the experiments. The experiment was programmed and conducted with software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and carried out at the University of Munich. The sub-
jects were recruited from the laboratorys subject pool and included students from
all elds. The total number of subjects was 282.19 Each subject participated in 24
rounds of the same treatment (exactly one of the four treatments BASE, UNEQUAL,
PRIVATE, and PUBLIC) and kept his individual role as alliance player (A or B) or
as stand-alone player (C) throughout all rounds. Anonymity was preserved during
the experiment, and payments were made in private. In each session, students were
divided into subgroups and randomly rematched within these, in order to eliminate
quasi-repeated games e¤ects. The instructions (see appendix) were given to them and
read to them by the laboratory sta¤, and, in addition, an entry quiz guided them
through the experiment.
The prize value v was 450 tokens (at a conversion rate of 45 tokens = EUR 1).
Individual e¤ort had to be chosen as a number from the set f0; 1; 2; :::; 250g (in the
contest between the alliance and player C as well as in the potential internal ght
between A and B). The subjects experienced the probabilistic nature of the outcome
via a fortune wheelon the computer screen. The fortune wheel is a disc that has
two segments in di¤erent colors, where the size of the segments is proportional to the
relative amounts of e¤orts xA+xB, and xC , respectively. A pointer spins clockwise and
then stops in one of the segments, and victory is attributed to AB or to C, depending
on the segment in which the pointer comes to a rest.20 Accordingly, the fortune wheel
translates the true win probability, which is a function of the e¤orts expended, into a
graphical representation that makes it easy for the subjects to understand their win
probability.
Apart from a show-up fee of EUR 4, subjects received a xed payment of EUR 0:6
for each of the 24 independent rounds (which basically served as their total endowment).
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid according to their decisions and
outcomes in 6 of these rounds (randomly selected out of 24). Positive prot was
19We run three sessions per treatment with 24 subjects in each session, except that there were 21
subjects in two sessions of the UNEQUAL treatment. Average age of the participants was 23, 44%
were male students, and around 18% were studing economics or closely related programs.
20Similarly, in the distributional conict between A and B, a fortune wheel was used with two
segment representing each players relative e¤ort in stage 3.
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added to and negative prot was deducted from the xed payment. Average earnings
per subject were EUR 25 in total.21 Before ending the session, subjects were asked
to answer an exit questionnaire. The time for a session was very similar across the
treatments (roughly 1:5 hours).
3 Main hypotheses
We now formulate testable hypotheses on treatment e¤ects with respect to the players
choices. The highlighted hypotheses concentrate on our main question on the emer-
gence of internal conict (stage 2), but we also discuss the implications for contest
e¤ort in stage 1 and stage 3.
In the absence of motivations other than maximizing own monetary payo¤, all four
treatments have the same subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with respect to choices in
all three stages. The rst testable hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 1: The share of alliance players who choose internal conict is the same
for all treatments and equal to zero.
As it is well known from other contest experiments, individuals exhibit quite some
amount of heterogeneity and follow other motives besides pure maximization of mone-
tary payo¤s. Although individuals do not have a monetary incentive to choose internal
ght, we suspect that, in all treatments, a signicant share of alliance players prefers
to ght internally, in contrast to Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the treatment variations
could a¤ect individual choices of "split" versus "ght". This leads to two alternative
hypotheses on the treatment e¤ects, drawing on evolutionary stability arguments and
on arguments that have been developed on non-aggression treaties in political science.
Consider rst the e¤ect of an unequal peaceful split of the prize (the UNEQUAL
treatment). If players maximize their material payo¤s only, they choose the peaceful
split in equilibrium even if they obtain only the smaller share of the prize (30%). If,
however, playersbehavior is shaped by evolutionary forces in the context of a nite
population (as introduced by Scha¤er 1988), relative rather than absolute material
payo¤ of a player determines the evolutionary success of this player. In the context of
contest theory this has two implications. First, evolutionarily stable strategies typically
involve higher ghting e¤ort than in the Nash equilibrium, a result which is in line
21The minimum total payment was the show-up fee and the maximum payment was EUR 61.
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with most of the experimental evidence.22 Second, players choose conict as part of
the evolutionarily stable strategy if their peaceful share is too small relative to others
shares, even if their expected material payo¤ from ghting is lower than their material
payo¤ in the peaceful sharing regime.23 This yields an alternative hypothesis on the
treatment e¤ect of UNEQUAL.
Hypothesis A1: (i) The share of alliance players who choose internal conict is lowest
among players who would receive 70 percent of the prize in case of a peaceful split,
larger for players in the BASE treatment (with an equal peaceful split), and highest
for players who would receive only 30 percent of the prize. (ii) Overall, there is more
internal conict in the UNEQUAL treatment than in the BASE treatment.
If players with a small peaceful share are more likely to oppose the peaceful split,
this should result in signicantly more internal conict in the UNEQUAL treatment
than in the BASE treatment, because one alliance player is typically su¢ cient to trigger
internal conict. In addition to the evolutionary reasoning, some behavioral theories
may o¤er alternative explanations.24
Turn now to the impact of ex ante non-aggression declarations on the internal
allocation of the prize (the PRIVATE and the PUBLIC treatment). Recall that, in
these treatments, all players need to make a declaration and that a players declaration
is non-binding for the players actual choice whether to ght. If players care only
about monetary payo¤, such declarations have no informational value and should not
a¤ect the ghting intensity nor the likelihood of internal ght (see Hypothesis 1).25
Alternatively, there are arguments discussed in political science about reputational or
audience cost of breaking non-aggression promises.26 If such declarations have a causal
e¤ect on subsequent behavior and if there is a cost of breaking such "agreements",
then public declarations should help to reduce the probability of conict. Moreover,
22Building on Scha¤ers (1988) concept of evolutionary stability in nite populations, evolutionary
stability has been considered, for instance, by Leininger (2003), Eaton and Eswaran (2003), Eaton et
al. (2011), and Konrad and Morath (2012a, 2012b) for di¤erent types of contests (which are similar
although not completely identical to our experimental framework).
23We do not formalize these results here, as they are similar to the formal analysis in Konrad and
Morath (2012a).
24For instance, individuals who care about relative standing may prefer a symmetric contest with
low payo¤ rather than a higher own payo¤ that, however, is smaller than the co-players payo¤.
Similarly, spiteful attitudes, or even a subjective non-monetary benet from participating in a contest
or winning it may contribute to such a behavioral pattern.
25This is also in line with the historical evidence in the introduction.
26See Mattes and Vonnahme (2010) for a short review and an empirical assessment.
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there might even be a cost of breaking unobserved private declarations, in which case
the likelihood of conict in PRIVATE would be lower than in the BASE treatment.27
Hypothesis A2: (i) The share of alliance players who choose internal conict is lowest
in the PUBLIC treatment, higher in the PRIVATE treatment and highest in the BASE
treatment. (ii) The declaration in the PRIVATE treatment is a better predictor of a
players actual choice whether to ght than the declaration in the PUBLIC treatment.
Our data allow us to test the alternative Hypothesis A2 against the prediction of an
ine¤ectiveness of ex ante non-binding agreements and to study the correlation between
declarations and actual ghting choices. In the PRIVATE treatment, we expect a
larger share of players to truthfully state the prize sharing intention, in which case
the correlation between declaration and actual choice should be stronger in PRIVATE
than in PUBLIC. Moreover, we will study the relationship between declarations and
e¤ort choices and how the history of the game in terms of stage 1 e¤ort choices a¤ects
the emergence of conict.
Treatment di¤erences in the likelihood of internal conict should a¤ect e¤ort contri-
butions in stage 1 when the alliance competes with the outgroup player.28 Hypothesis
1 predicts the same likelihood of internal conict across all treatments and therefore
the same stage 1 e¤ort. If the treatments UNEQUAL, PRIVATE or PUBLIC have a
higher (lower) likelihood of internal conict this reduces (increases) the alliances value
of winning stage 1. Therefore, if Hypothesis A1 applies, then alliance e¤ort in the
UNEQUAL treatment should be lower than the BASE treatment. If Hypothesis A2
applies, alliance e¤ort in the PUBLIC treatment should be higher than in the BASE
treatment and should be between those two in the PRIVATE treatment, in line with
the anticipated likelihood of internal conict. If ex ante declarations cannot reduce the
probability of internal conict (Hypothesis 1), then we expect average stage 1 e¤orts
to be una¤ected by the non-binding declarations. Choices in the previous stages of
the game might also inuence e¤ort expended in the internal ght (stage 3), and there
27There are many possible channels through which the private and the public announcement could
matter. In the context of theories about taste for consistency (see, e.g., Festinger 1957, Cialdini et al.
1995, and the discussion in Guadagno and Cialdini 2010), self-image (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), a
subjective cost of lying (Gneezy 2005, Lundquist et al. 2009), and other factors that are not directly
related to monetary payo¤ in the specic interaction, one could see a role for both private and public
declarations.
28Ke et al. (2013) focused on this aspect in an experiment in which ghting or peaceful sharing was
strictly exogenously imposed and found that internal ghting generates a hold-up e¤ect as regards
contributions to the alliance e¤ort.
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may be self-selection into stage 3. While we do not expect that this causes systematic
di¤erences in stage 3 e¤ort, we will also briey discuss behavior in the internal ght.
4 Results
In this section, we report the main results following the logic of backward induction in
solving the game, starting therefore with stage 3 (the internal conict).
Fighting after the break-up of the alliance (stage 3). On average, former
alliance members expend an e¤ort of 165 in the internal conict (stage 3), compared
to an equilibrium value of 112:5 for players who maximize their monetary payo¤s, in
line with the overdissipation results in most contest experiments. (See Figure A.1 in
the appendix for time series of average stage 3 e¤ort across treatments.) Turning to
a more systematic and detailed analysis of e¤ort in the ght between former alliance
members, we use random e¤ects Tobit models to examine whether treatment variations
and history matters in case alliances end up ghting internally.29
In the simplest model where we only include treatment dummies (PRIVATE, PUB-
LIC, and UNEQUAL), we nd no signicant treatment di¤erence for the average e¤ort
expended in the internal conict (compare the rst estimation in Table 1; the constant
measures average e¤ort in the BASE treatment).30 In a second estimation, we further
explore whether playerschoices in stages 1 and 2 (and, in the treatments with dec-
larations, also in stage 0) can explain stage 3 e¤ort. In terms of decisions of whether
to ght internally, the included variables are: own ex ante declaration ("Fight0") in
treatments PRIVATE and PUBLIC, the co-players declaration ("Fight0_partner") in
PUBLIC, and the actual ghting choice in stage 2 ("Fight2", "Fight2_partner").31
29By using a tobit specication, we take into consideration that e¤ort choices are restricted between
0 and 250 and that in all treatments a number of choices lie on the boundary. Also, the estimation
accounts for heterogeneity across players and high correlations within each individual players, by
adding random e¤ects to the tobit model. We report results using data from periods 13 to 24, i.e., we
consider more experienced play. Using the full dataset does not yield qualitatively di¤erent results.
30Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the level of matching groups (one observation is the
average e¤ort per matching group over periods 13-24) suggest that both UNEQUAL and PRIVATE
are signicantly di¤erent from BASE, at the 5%-level. The di¤erence to the regression results in
Table 1 might be caused by the very few observations in stage 3, considerable heterogeneity across
individuals, and by not taking into account the signicant proportion of observations lying on the
upper bound (250); when controlling for individual heterogeneity and cencored observations as in the
random-e¤ects tobit estimations, the di¤erences are no longer signicant.
31"Fight0", "Fight0_partner", "Fight2", and "Fight2_partner" are dummy variables that are equal
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Dependent Variable: alliance players e¤ort in stage 3 (periods 13-24)
Independent variables: xtTobit1 xtTobit2 xtTobit3
Constant 172.02*** 183.61*** 184.99***
(16.56) (31.15) (33.77)
UNEQUAL 7.58 5.85 6.95
(21.54) (22.23) (22.36)
UNEQUAL30% 2.24 1.39
(16.75) (16.91)
PRIVATE 17.94 -9.06 -7.91
(24.55) (28.16) (28.36)
PRIVATEFight0 57.21 59.99
(34.92) (36.03)
PUBLIC -2.12 -2.03 -0.13
(22.80) (22.77) (22.81)
PUBLICFight0 12.93 10.70
(36.07) (38.05)
PUBLICFight0_partner 55.03 50.02
(35.94) (36.02)
E¤ort1 -0.13 -0.14
(0.10) (0.10)
E¤ort1_di¤_abs 0.34*** 0.35***
(0.08) (0.08)
Fight2 -24.79 -25.69
(26.92) (26.94)
Fight2_partner -29.79 -32.10
(26.10) (26.13)
Individual characteristics No No Yes
Log-Likelihood -1160.82 -1149.41 -1148.72
Wald 2() 0.84 23.10** 24.41*
Note: 120 subjects, 256 observations. 4 left-censored obs., 194 uncensored obs., 58 right-censored
obs. in Tobit models. ***(**,*) signicant at 1%(5%,10%). The estimations include treatments
dummies as well as interactions indicating the player with the small share in UNEQUAL ("30%")
and the declaration on the ghting intention by themselves ("Fight0" in PRIVATE and PUBLIC)
and their partners ("Fight0_partner" in PUBLIC), actual ghting decisions in stage 2 ("Fight2",
"Fight2_partner"), e¤ort choice in stage 1 ("E¤ort1"), the absolute di¤erence between own and al-
liance partners stage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤_abs"), and individual characteristics. Reference category
is the BASE treatment.
Table 1: Alliance playerse¤ort in the internal ght (stage 3).
to 1 if one (or ones partner) chooses "ght" in stage 0 or stage 2, respectively, and zero otherwise.
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Moreover, we include the own e¤ort choice in stage 1 ("E¤ort1"), the absolute di¤er-
ence between the two alliance membersstage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤_abs"), and, for
the UNEQUAL treatment, a dummy that indicates that a player would have received
the small share in case of peace ("UNEQUAL30%"). In a third estimation, we further
control for individual characteristics, including age, gender, height, number of siblings,
and a dummy for economics students; none of these variables is signicant. The co-
e¢ cient that measures absolute di¤erence in the two alliance members contributions
to alliance e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤_abs") is highly signicant and positive: More unequal
e¤ort contributions in stage 1 lead to more e¤ort expended in the internal ght.32
Ex ante declarations on the prize sharing intentions have some weak impact on
e¤ort in the internal conict. Alliance members who privately declared an intention
to ght expend around 60 tokens more than those who, ex ante, declared an intention
to split. This is shown by the coe¢ cient of "PRIVATEFight0" in Table 1. When
the initial declarations are displayed to other players, this e¤ect of a declaration to
ght is lower (compare the estimated coe¢ cient of "PUBLICFight0"). A publicly
announced intention to ght, however, seems to have an impact on the alliance part-
ners e¤ort choice and makes him expend around 50 tokens more, compared to an ex
ante declaration of "split" (see the coe¢ cient of "PUBLICFight0_partner"). These
large coe¢ cients are not signicant though (the p-values are larger than 0.1), poten-
tially because there is only a small number of observations of internal ght in the
PRIVATE and PUBLIC treatments. Finally, whether it is their own or their partners
actual choice to ght (i.e., stage 2 choices: "Fight2" and "Fight2_partner") does not
signicantly a¤ect e¤ort in the internal conict.
Result 1: a) Former alliance members of a victorious alliance ght heavily if they turn
against each other; average e¤ort does not signicantly di¤er across treatments, in line
with Hypothesis 1. b) More unequal e¤ort contributions of the alliance players when
ghting the outgroup player cause the subsequent internal ght (if reached) to be more
intense.
32Notice that only the absolute value the coe¢ cient of the di¤erence in stage 1 e¤orts has a signicant
impact on stage 3 e¤ort; the simple di¤erence between own and co-players stage 1 e¤ort is not
signicant. Similarly, own stage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1") does not signicantly explain stage 3 choices
(even when excluding "E¤ort1_di¤_abs"). Due to space constraint, we do not report these two
specications in Table 1. There are multiple explanations for why players who expended much in the
alliance contest might also expend high e¤ort in stage 3; but also players who expended comparatively
little e¤ort might increase their stage 3 e¤ort, for instance because they are narrowly selsh players
who free-ride in stage 1 and take their chances in stage 3.
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No. of Ex ante No. of Actual % internal
obs. in declaration obs. in binding decision ght if
Treatment stage 0 "split" "ght" stage 2 "split" "ght" AB wins
BASE 1152 N/A N/A 550 86.4% 13.6% 24.0%
UNEQUAL 1056 N/A N/A 448 67.4% 32.6% 54.5%
PRIVATE 1152 80.9% 19.1% 560 83.2% 16.8% 27.5%
PUBLIC 1152 88.9% 11.1% 528 85.6% 14.4% 25.4%
Table 2: Alliance playersdecisions on the prize sharing rule before and after the contest
with the outgroup player.
Initial intentions and actual choices to break-up (stage 2). We next turn to
our main question on the determinants of the likelihood of a victorious alliance to
break up and ght (Hypothesis 1 and alternative Hypotheses A1 and A2). For an
overview of the results, consider rst the right part of Table 2, which presents the
alliance playersactual choices of "split" versus "ght", conditional on reaching stage
2.33 First, we observe a substantial amount of internal conict in all of the treatments.
In the UNEQUAL treatment, "ght" is chosen more frequently than in the BASE
treatment. Also, the percentage of winning alliances ending up in internal ght is
more than twice as high in the UNEQUAL treatment (54:5%) compared to the BASE
treatment (24%). This considerable propensity to ght despite its negative material
consequences contradicts Hypothesis 1, but is very much in line with Hypothesis A1.
As suggested by evolutionary theory (and as we will see below), many players with
a peaceful share of only 30 percent prefer ghting and impose this ght upon their
co-players who, in the absence of ghting, would have obtained a 70 percent share and
would have been satised with the peaceful settlement.
Second, the ex ante declaration stage does not have a noticeable impact on the
average ghting propensity. In the three treatments with an equal split in case of peace
(BASE, PRIVATE, PUBLIC), alliance players preferred to "ght" in 13:6%   16:8%
of the cases. The left part of Table 2 shows that there are some alliance players who
declare an intention to "ght" even when this declaration is publicly observed (11:1%
in PUBLIC). The share of alliance players who declare to "ght" is almost twice as high
(19:1%) when the declarations are not shown to others in the group. This di¤erence in
33Note that, in the experimental instructions, we did not use the word "ght". Instead, participants
were asked to choose between a split of the prize (in predened shares) and competing with their co-
player about the entire prize value. Yet we will use the words "split" and "ght" for simplicity
whenever we talk about this decision.
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declarations contrasts with very small di¤erences in the frequency of actual choices to
ght between the PRIVATE and the PUBLIC treatment (16:8% compared to 14:4%).
To explore in detail what inuences an alliance players likelihood to choose the
internal ght, we report random-e¤ects logistic regressions and average marginal e¤ects
(AME) in Table 3. The dependent variable is an alliance players binary choice of
whether or not to choose to ght against the former ally in case of a victory against
the outgroup player C; "1" indicates the choice of internal conict and "0" the choice
of the peaceful split. The reference category is the BASE treatment.
Subjects are 14 percentage points more likely to choose "ght" in the UNEQUAL
treatment than in the BASE treatment (see the rst estimation in Table 3). Separating
the subjects in the UNEQUAL treatment according to the peaceful share they would
receive, those who would get the large share are 11 percentage points less likely to
choose ght than those in the BASE treatment (now measured by "UNEQUAL" in
xtLogit2 and xtLogit3); the estimated coe¢ cient is signicant at the 5%-level. The
subjects with the smaller share (30%), however, are 31 percentage points more likely
to choose ght than those with the larger share (measured by "UNEQUAL30%")
and therefore about 20 percentage points more likely to choose ght than the subjects
in the BASE treatment. Hence, the regression results further corroborate the results
obtained from descriptive data and are in line with Hypothesis A1.
Further, consider the treatments with ex ante declarations. These are on average
not signicantly di¤erent from the BASE treatment in terms of ghting probability
(compare the coe¢ cients of "PRIVATE" and "PUBLIC" in xtLogit1). Private or public
announcements do not signicantly a¤ect the probability that a victorious alliance
breaks up and ends up in an internal ght, in contrast to Hypothesis A2.34
Finally, the di¤erence between own e¤ort and partners e¤ort in the stage 1 contest
with the outgroup player ("E¤ort1_di¤") has a strongly signicant impact on the
likelihood to ght (0.1 percentage points per 1 unit of contribution gap).35 The more
a player expended in stage 1 and the less his co-player contributed to alliance e¤ort,
34Using two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests at the level of matching groups, the
treatments PRIVATE and PUBLIC do not signicantly di¤er from BASE with respect to individual
choices of "ght" and overall occurrence of an internal ght; in UNEQUAL, however, both the share
of individuals who choose ght and the overall likelihood of an internal ght signicantly di¤er from
BASE (p-value < 0:001).
35In the UNEQUAL treatment, this e¤ects holds independently of the peaceful share a player would
have received; an additional interaction term of "E¤ort1_di¤" and a dummy indicating the subjects
with the smaller share is insignicant.
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Dependent Variable: A dummy for alliance players choice between "ght" (=1) and
"split" (=0) in stage 2 conditional on winning in stage 1 (periods 13-24)
Independent Variables: xtLogit1 AME1 xtLogit2 AME2 xtLogit3 AME3
Constant -2.84 -2.81 -3.16
(0.41) (0.49) (0.55)
UNEQUAL 1.44*** 0.14** -1.71** -0.11** -1.69** -0.11**
(0.52) (0.07) (0.77) (0.05) (0.77) (0.05)
UNEQUAL30% 4.76*** 0.31*** 4.71*** 0.31***
(0.78) (0.05) (0.78) (0.05)
PRIVATE -0.30 -0.02 -1.71** -0.11** -1.82*** -0.12***
(0.54) (0.03) (0.69) (0.05) (0.68) (0.05)
PRIVATEFight0 3.65*** 0.24*** 3.52*** 0.23***
(0.83) (0.06) (0.83) (0.06)
PUBLIC 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.00
(0.53) (0.04) (0.52) (0.03) (0.51) (0.03)
PUBLICFight0 1.73* 0.11* 1.62* 0.10*
(1.00) (0.07) (0.97) (0.08)
PUBLICFight0_partner 1.70 0.11 1.56 0.10
(1.17) (0.07) (1.16) (0.08)
E¤ort1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
E¤ort1_di¤ 0.02*** 0.001*** 0.02*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Individual characteristics No No Yes
Log-likelihood -352.39 -276.67 -275.00
Wald 2() 12.59*** 88.48*** 90.93***
Note: 184 subjects, 940 observations. ***(**,*) signicant at 1%(5%,10%). The estimations include
treatments dummies as well as interactions indicating the player with the small share ("30%" in
UNEQUAL), the declaration on their own and partners ghting intention ("Fight0" in PRIVATE
and PUBLIC; "Fight0_partner" in PUBLIC), e¤ort choices in stage 1, the di¤erence between own and
alliance partners stage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤"), and individual characteristics. Reference category is
the BASE treatment.
Table 3: Alliance playersprobability to choose the internal ght (after having defeated
the outgroup player).
the higher is the likelihood that the player triggers internal ght.36 While we did not
36"E¤ort1" and "E¤ort1_di¤" are obviously correlated; hence, the coe¢ cient of "E¤ort1" becomes
signicant when dropping the "E¤ort1_di¤". Moreover, contrary to the estimations of stage 3 e¤ort,
the simple di¤erence between own and co-players stage 1 e¤ort matters for a players willingness to
ght; the estimated coe¢ cient of the absolute di¤erence is not signicant. Finally, the intensity of
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formulate a hypothesis on this relationship, possible explanations for this e¤ect include
a sunk-cost interpretation, a feeling of entitlement to the prize, and a tendency to
punish the co-player for having contributed too little in stage 1.
Result 2: a) The individual probability of choosing ght is highest among players who
would get the small share ( 30%) in the UNEQUAL treatment and lowest among those
who would get the large share ( 70%) in the UNEQUAL treatment; overall, the likelihood
of internal ght is more than twice as high in UNEQUAL compared to BASE.
b) Ex ante declarations on prize sharing intentions do not have a signicant e¤ect on
the likelihood of internal conict. c) The probability to choose "ght" is increasing
in the di¤erence between own and the co-players e¤ort contribution when ghting the
outgroup player.
Even if there is no average e¤ect of the ex ante declarations for the decision whether
to ght, players may try to make use of the public declarations and react to whether
the declarations are public or private. The results in Table 3 show that those alliance
players who have privately declared that they intend to choose "ght" are 24 percentage
points more likely to actually initiate a ght in stage 2 than those who have declared
to "split" (compare "PRIVATEFight0" in xtLogit2). This suggests that private dec-
larations are not random, but reveal true intentions. Also in the PUBLIC treatment,
a player is more likely to initiate internal ght if he declared an intention to choose
"ght" in stage 0 (see the coe¢ cients for "PUBLICFight0" in Table 3); the signi-
cance level, however, is much weaker (and the marginal e¤ect is smaller) than in the
PRIVATE treatment. The declarations in the PUBLIC treatment may not fully reveal
a players true preference, but alliance players may choose a declaration which they ex-
pect to have a strategic e¤ect on the alliance partners behavior or on the joint enemy.
This can explain why the private non-aggression declarations (in PRIVATE) may be
a better predictor of playersactual choice than the public non-aggression declaration
(in PUBLIC). Also, it can explain if the e¤ort contribution to the ght against the
outgroup does not signicantly react to a non-aggression declaration in the PUBLIC
treatment (as we will examine in the next section).
As an additional remark on the declarations, Table 4 contrasts declarations on the
prize sharing intention with actual choices. In both treatments PRIVATE and PUB-
LIC, a large share of players of a victorious alliance make a choice in stage 2 which is
the contest in stage 1 (measured by the outgroup player Cs e¤ort or by total e¤ort expended by all
three players) does not explain an alliance players choice of internal conict.
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Treatment PRIVATE PUBLIC
Declaration = Choice 86% 84.9%
Declaration 6= Choice 14% 15.2%
of which:
Declaration="ght" & Choice="split" 60.3% 31.3%
Declaration="split" & Choice="ght" 39.7% 68.8%
Table 4: Comparison of ex ante declarations and actual ghting decisions in the PRI-
VATE and the PUBLIC treatment.
consistent with the ex ante declaration (86% in the treatment with private declarations
and 84:9% if the declaration was publicly announced).37 The two treatments, however,
di¤er when analyzing deviations of victorious alliance players from their initial decla-
ration. In the PRIVATE treatment, a majority of players switch from declaring "ght"
to an actual choice of "split" (60:3%); in the PUBLIC treatment, this share is only
31:3%, but here the majority of switches is from declaring "split" to an actual choice
of "ght" (68:8%). This observation is in line with Hypothesis A2. In the PRIVATE
treatment, alliance players could state their true ghting intention without fearing any
consequences for the co-players actions. (We can speculate about what causes players
sometimes to switch to "split"; one possible reason is the partners e¤ort contribution.)
In the PUBLIC treatment, the low share of alliance players who declared "ght" and
the substantial share of players who deviated from a declaration of "split" suggests an
attempt to make strategic use of the (non-binding) public announcement by declaring
"split" despite an intention to ght.38
37This reveals the endogeneity problem that may loom in empirical work which Mattes and Von-
nahme (2010) also hint at: Using non-aggression declarations as an exogenous explanatory variable
might overestimate the e¤ect of such promises for the probability of violent conict.
38Further support for this result can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix, where we re-examine
the probability of choosing "ght" in stage 2, restricting the analysis to two subsamples. The rst
subsample only includes observations where victorious alliance members had ex ante declared an
intention to split. After controlling for di¤erences in stage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤") and individual
characteristics, the likelihood of a switch from "split" to "ght" is still signicantly higher for players
in the PUBLIC treatment than in the PRIVATE treatment (compare the rst estimation in Table
A.1 in the appendix). On the other hand, since ex ante declarations of "ght" should reveal players
true intention in both the PRIVATE and the PUBLIC treatment, this treatment di¤erence disappears
in the estimation restricted to the subsample of players who initially declared an intention to ght
(compare the second estimation in Table A.1).
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E¤ort in the conict with the stand-alone player (stage 1). We nally turn
to the contest between the alliance and the outgroup player (stage 1) to test whether
the likelihood of internal ghting a¤ects the alliances ability to mobilize joint e¤ort.
The time series of e¤orts is shown in Figure A.2 in the appendix.39 We again use
random e¤ects Tobit models to estimate an alliance players e¤ort in stage 1 (see
Table 5). The included explanatory variables are treatment dummies ("UNEQUAL",
"PRIVATE", "PUBLIC"), and, from estimation 2 onwards, variables indicating the
playersdeclarations in stage 0 ("Fight0", "Fight0_partner") and individual-specic
characteristics as obtained from the exit questionnaire.40
In all estimations in Table 5, we nd that average e¤ort in stage 1 in the UNEQUAL
treatment is around 17 points lower than average e¤ort expended in the BASE treat-
ment; the di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 5%-level. Hence, in line with the
results on the likelihood of internal conict (Hypothesis A1), the unequal split of the
prize reduces the alliance playersvalue of winning stage 1 and makes the hold-up prob-
lem more severe. Moreover, the coe¢ cients on the treatment dummies PRIVATE and
PUBLIC are both not signicantly di¤erent from zero (compare the rst estimation in
Table 5), which suggests that adopting a stage 0 with private or public declarations
does not help to mitigate the hold-up problem. This result is in line with the non-
binding nature of the ex ante declarations and with the previous observation that ex
ante declarations do not help to reduce the likelihood of internal ght (in contrast to
the alternative Hypothesis A2).41
Result 3: a) Anticipation of the higher internal ghting frequency in the UNEQUAL
treatment leads to lower stage 1 e¤ort of the alliance members, compared to the BASE
treatment. b) Non-binding ex ante declarations do not help to mitigate the hold-up
problem.
Even if there is no e¤ect of ex ante declarations on average, estimations 2 and
3 in Table 5 show that, in the PRIVATE treatment, alliance players who have se-
39The summary statistics in Figure A.2 in the appendix also suggest that strategic reaction ot the
outgroup player C to the treatment variations is very small; this can be conrmed by running random
e¤ects Tobit regressions similar to the estimated equation in Table 5.
40Among the individual characteristics included, the only signicant coe¢ cient is obtained for eco-
nomics students who expend around 18 points less e¤ort in stage 1.
41The results on the treatment di¤erences are supported by two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) tests at the level of matching groups: PRIVATE and PUBLIC do not signicantly di¤er
from BASE, but we can reject (at the 5%-level) that average e¤ort in UNEQUAL is the same as in
BASE.
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Dependent Variable: alliance players e¤ort in stage 1 (periods 13-24)
Independent variables: xtTobit1 xtTobit2 xtTobit3
Constant 54.10*** 54.13*** 59.28***
(5.43) (5.36) (6.14)
UNEQUAL -17.06** -17.00** -15.26**
(7.88) (7.78) (7.39)
PRIVATE -0.59 -7.13 -4.26
(7.68) (7.67) (7.34)
PRIVATEFight0 39.78*** 41.63***
(6.87) (6.84)
PUBLIC -0.84 0.80 2.44
(7.68) (7.64) (7.24)
PUBLICFight0 10.63 11.03
(7.74) (7.71)
PUBLICFight0_partner -30.55*** -30.85***
(6.73) (6.72)
Characteristics No No Yes
Log-likelihood -10427 -10339 -10389
Wald 2() 6.49* 62.59*** 84.88***
Note: 188 subjects, 2256 observations. There are 281 left-censored obs., 1961 uncensored obs., 14
right-censored obs. in Tobit models. ***(**,*) signicant at 1%(5%,10%). The estimations include
treatments dummies as well as interactions indicating their own and their partners declaration on
the ghting intentions ("Fight0" in PRIVATE and PUBLIC; "Fight0_partner" in PUBLIC) and
individual characteristics. Reference category is the BASE treatment.
Table 5: Alliance playerse¤ort in the conict with the outgroup player (stage 1).
cretly declared that they intend to choose "ght" expend signicantly more e¤ort
(around 40 points) than those who have declared to "split" (compare the coe¢ cient of
"PRIVATEFight0"). Second, in the PUBLIC treatment, players who have declared
that they intend to choose "ght" do not expend signicantly more e¤ort (although the
estimated coe¢ cient of "PUBLICFight0" is positive). Third, if in the PUBLIC treat-
ment the partner in the alliance has declared an intention to ght ("Fight0_partner"),
a player expends much less e¤ort (the coe¢ cient is 30:55 and highly signicant). Even
if the declarations are non-binding, they may have informational value in a world in
which players dislike to deviate from their previous declaration.42 Consequently, play-
42If players di¤er in their cost of making a false or inconsistent declaration and if this cost is strictly
positive, then the set of players who declare "split" is a mixture of people who eventually choose "split"
and who eventually choose "ght". But only those who eventually choose "ght" and have a high
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ers may take this declaration quite seriously and anticipate that a public announcement
to ght comes along with a higher likelihood of internal conict.
5 Conclusions
Members of a victorious alliance may decide to peacefully share the prize that they
have jointly won, or they may decide to enter into a resource-wasteful conict about
the spoils of victory. Whether or not they ght will depend on the institutional setup
and existing norms and rules about how to split the prize if the division of the prize
takes place peacefully. While many factors may play a role in the historical examples
discussed in the introduction, the sharing rules in case of a peaceful settlement are
potentially important factors that may yield di¤erent probabilities of the emergence
of internal distributional conict. We study experimentally how di¤erent institutional
environments a¤ect the emergence of internal conict and how variations in the threat
of internal conict inuence the alliance memberswillingness to contribute to the ght
against an outgroup player.
As our rst main result, we nd that an imbalance between the alliance members
strengthin the internal conict and the rent distribution in case of a peaceful set-
tlement matters for the likelihood of internal conict. Players are more likely to ght
internally the more unequal is the division of the prize, even if the peaceful settlement
yields a higher material payo¤ to both alliance players. This result is in line with the
prediction based on evolutionary arguments where players care about their relative
material payo¤. Moreover, players contribute less e¤ort to the contest against the out-
group player if the probability of a break-up of the alliance in a ght about the prize
is higher.
As a second dimension, we study the role of non-aggression declarations at the onset
of the conict between the alliance and its adversary: Alliance players may make non-
binding declarations at this point about their intention whether to ght internally or
to share peacefully with their alliance partner. We analyze whether the opportunity to
make such declarations a¤ects the actual ghting probability and the e¤ort contribution
to the contest against the outgroup player, and we consider both publicly revealed
declarations and private declarations which are not shown to the co-players but may
cost of declaring "split" under these circumstances will declare "ght". Accordingly, a declaration of
"ght" is revealing in such a context.
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convey information about the initial prize sharing intention. In line with the prediction
for players who maximize their monetary payo¤, the opportunity to make declarations
neither changes the actual probability to ght nor the e¤ort contributions of alliance
players in the conict with the outgroup player in a signicant way, compared to a
situation where declarations of this type are not possible. Even if alliance players may
intend to make use of a public declaration of an intention to share the prize peacefully
with the former ally, the opportunity to make such non-aggression declarations does
not help to mitigate the hold-up problem: it does not reduce actual ghting inside
victorious alliances.
In all treatments that we consider, the likelihood of internal distributional conict is
higher the more unequally the alliance members have contributed to the ght against
the joint enemy. Former alliance members who expended more e¤ort than their al-
liance partner when ghting the outgroup player are more likely to oppose the peaceful
settlement. Moreover, higher asymmetries in the alliance partnerscontributions to
alliance e¤ort cause a subsequent internal ght to be more intense.
To summarize, our experiment conrms the emergence of resource-wasteful conict
even in situations where peaceful settlement leads to a Pareto superior outcome. By
opposing the peaceful split, players are willing to sacrice a substantial share of the
material payo¤ in case of peace and to accept an expected material payo¤which, taking
into account the very intense ghting in the internal conict and the overdissipation of
resources in this conict, is much lower than what they would receive in case of peace.
The setup of our experiment allows to identify two main reasons for why, despite this
dissipation of resources, alliances break up in a violent conict: Former allies are not
willing to accept a distribution of resources that does not coincide with their relative
strength and with their relative contribution to alliance success. In turn, alliances that
are more "symmetric" in terms of peaceful arrangements and in terms of willingness
to contribute to alliance e¤ort are more successful in keeping internal peace and, as
a direct e¤ect, they are more successful in the conict with the joint enemy. Our
experiment also shows that institutions that allow players to declare their intention to
keep peace (or ght) do not e¤ectively improve alliance success, even if some players
may feel a cost of breaking such initial arrangements. Instead, in our context, similarity
between players with respect to their willingness to contribute to the joint cause and
their shares in the prize seems to be more promising for the formation of alliances in
the shadow of conict.
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A Additional results
A.1 Choices of "ght" versus "split" conditional on the initial
declaration
Dependent Variable: A dummy for alliance players actual choice between
"ght" (=1) and "split" (=0) in stage 2 conditional on winning in stage 1
Data Subsample 1 (Declaration="split") Subsample 2 (Declaration="Fight)
Model xtLogit1 AME1 xtLogit2 AME2
Constant -3.68*** 0.96**
(0.50) (0.46)
PUBLIC 0.94** 0.05* -0.45 -0.10
(0.48) (0.03) (0.45) (0.09)
E¤ort1_di¤ 0.01*** 0.001*** 0.01*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PUBLICE¤ort1_di¤ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Characteristics Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -235.95 -93.90
Wald 2() 35.53*** 20.76***
Note: Subsample 1: 94 subjects, 930 observations. Subsample 2: 37subjects, 156 observations.
***(**,*) signicant at 1%(5%,10%). The estimations include a treatment dummy ("PUBLIC"),
the di¤erence between own and alliance partners stage 1 e¤ort ("E¤ort1_di¤") as well as their inter-
action term, and individual characteristics as obtained from the exit questionnaire. Reference category
is the PRIVATE treatment.
Table A.1: Relation between initial ghting intentions and actual ghting choice.
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A.2 Average e¤ort in the internal conict
Figure A.1: Average e¤ort of players A or B in stage 3 (by treatment).
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A.3 Average e¤ort in the conict between the alliance and
the stand-alone player
Figure A.2: Average e¤ort in stage 1 for alliance players (A or B) and player C.
37
B Supplementary appendix (for online publication)
Experimental Instructions (a sample for the PUBLIC treatment)1
Welcome to this experiment! Please read this instruction carefully and completely. Properly
understanding the instruction will help you to make better decisions and hence earn more
money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment
we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Talers
you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash
you will gain at the end of todays experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the
experiment, each participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants
during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory
without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand; an experimenter
will come to you.
1. Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you will
rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions will be presented
to you through the computer screen.
In the experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. These groups are ran-
domly composed in each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The
money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your
group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, players A, B,
and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition in each round works as follows:
1. Two players A and B form an "alliance". Player C is playing on his own.
2. If player C wins the competition, he will gain the whole prize of 450 Talers.
3. In case the alliance of A and B wins the competition, then players A and B have
to choose between two possible options about how the prize should be divided among
them:
1The original instructions distributed to the participants were in German.
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 Option 1: A and B each obtain half of the prize, i.e., 225 Talers each.
 Option 2: A and B compete for the whole prize of 450 Talers.
4. Your role in the experiment will be either that of player A, B, or C. This role will be
randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep his role throughout the entire
experiment.
5. At the beginning of each round, players A and B declare how they prefer to divide the
prize if they, as an alliance, win the competition against player C (option 1 or option
2). Afterwards, this decision will be displayed on the screen to all players of a group.
There will be the possibility to change the own choice if the alliance of A and B wins
the competition with C.
6. Then, all players will simultaneously choose an "expenditure". Each player decides
independently on his own expenditure. A players expenditure is chosen as an integer
between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount of Talers the player would like
to expend in the competition to win the prize. You will have to pay this amount of
Talers to the lab, whether or not you win the competition. In the following, player As
expenditure will be denoted by XA, player Bs expenditure will be denoted by XB,
and player Cs expenditure will be denoted by XC .
7. Afterwards, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your
group have expended. The expenditures of players A and B will be added up, and
the sum of XA and XB corresponds to the expenditure that the alliance of A and B
spends on the competition. The total expense within a group is equal to the sum of all
players expenditures: XA +XB +XC .
8. Now a "fortune wheel" will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting of A and
B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is
divided into two colors - red and blue. The red color represents the total Talers spent
by player A and B (i.e., XA + XB). The blue color represents the Talers spent by
player C (i.e., XC). The size of the two colored areas on the wheel represents exactly
their shares in the total expense (XA +XB +XC).
9. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the top. After
some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly. If the arrow stops in the
red-colored area, players A and B win the prize. If the arrow stops in the blue-colored
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area, player C wins the prize. This means that the probability that players A and B
win the prize is equal to their share of their joint expenditure in the total expense,
hence
probability that A and B win = expenditure XA + expenditure XBtotal expense XA+XB+XC
Equivalently, the probability that player C wins the prize is equal to the share of his
expenditure in the total expense:
probability that C wins = expenditure XCtotal expense XA+XB+XC
For your information, the probabilities that either the alliance of A and B or player C
wins the prize will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his own expenditure
in the competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group. Note
that the more Talers a player spends, the more likely it is that he wins the competition.
More Talers expended, however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the lab.
10. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., XA = XB = XC = 0, then it is equally
likely that either the alliance of A and B or player C wins. If A and B both do not
expend any Taler, but C expends at least 1 Taler, player C wins the competition. If
player C does not expend any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both) expends
at least 1 Taler, the alliance of A and B wins the competition.
11. Every player has to pay his expenditure (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome
of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated as your
gain in the competition minus your expenditure: earnings = gain   expenditure.
12. In case player C wins, the competition ends. Player C gets the 450-Taler-prize; players
A and B will gain nothing. While players A and B do not have any gain, but have to
pay their expenditures, the earnings of player C are calculated as follows: Cs earnings
= 450 XC .
13. In case the alliance ofA andB wins the competition, then player C will receive nothing,
but he has to pay his expenditure. Players A and B have to choose independently
between two options about how to divide the prize among them:
 Option 1: The prize will be split between A and B: Each of the players A and
B obtains exactly half of the prize, i.e., 225 Talers. This means for A and B:
Earnings of A = 225  expenditure XA and earnings of B = 225 XB.
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 Option 2: Players A and B again compete with each other for the prize of 450
Talers. The procedure of this competition between A and B is basically the same
as in the competition between the alliance of A and B and player C. First, A
and B decide simultaneously and independently about the amount of Talers they
would like to expend in order to win the prize of 450 Taler. This expenditure is
again chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it has to be paid to the lab
in addition to the expenditures already paid (XA and XB), whether or not the
player wins the competition.
In the following these new expenditures of A and B are denoted by YA and YB.
(Note that these expenditures are only chosen if the alliance of A and B has
won against player C.) Again a fortune wheel will determine the winner. The
probability that A wins the prize of 450 Taler will be:
probability that A wins = expenditure YAtotal expense YA+YB
Equivalently, the probability that player B wins, will be:
probability that B wins = expenditure YBtotal expense YA+YB
Therefore, each players probability of winning now depends only on the expen-
ditures in this new competition. A yellow-colored area on the fortune wheel will
represent the share of As expenditure in total expense YA + YB, and a green-
colored area will represent the share of Bs expenditure in total expense. Again
the arrow will rotate to decide whether A or B wins the prize.
Hence, in case players A and B have won the competition with player C and
Option 2 has been selected, the earnings of players A and B are calculated as
follows.
 If A wins against B, player B has to pay both his expenditures XB and YB
but does not receive any gain. As earnings in this case will be: As earnings
= 450  XA   YA.
 If A loses against B, player A has to pay both his expenditures XA and YA
but does not receive any gain. Bs earnings will be: Bs earnings = 450 
XB   YB.
 The decision between options 1 and 2 will be made separately in each round, and
it will be valid for both player A and B of a group. Both players A and B decide
simultaneously and independently which option to choose.
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 If both players A and B of a group choose option 1 (half of the prize) , then
this option will be selected in this round.
 If one of two players A and B chooses option 1 and the other player chooses
option 2, then in 9 out of 10 cases option 2 (competition about the whole
prize) will be selected for both players and in 1 out of 10 cases option 1 (half
of the prize) will be selected for both players.
 If both players A and B choose option 2 (competition for the whole prize),
then option 2 will be selected in this round.
 Please note, that you can change the choice, which you made at the beginning of
the respective round. Even if, at the beginning of the round, you have declared
that you would choose option 1, you can now choose option 2 and vice versa in
case you have won the competition with player C.
2. Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have the same
role (player A, B, or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to
you in each round.
You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions you make will
remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited. After the
experiment, you will be asked to answer some questions, including some personal information
(e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and
strictly condential.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly select 6 out of the 24 rounds to pay
you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted to euros and paid to
you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds will not be paid to you and
that you do not have to pay the expenditures of these rounds either. You will get to know
which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after nishing these 24 rounds.
Additionally to your earnings in these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60 euros for
each of the 24 rounds you have played.
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are related to the
actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
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